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Abstract
We study the Bayesian model of opinion exchange of fully rational agents arranged on a
network. In this model, the agents receive private signals that are indicative of an unkown
state of the world. Then, they repeatedly announce the state of the world they consider most
likely to their neighbors, at the same time updating their beliefs based on their neighbors’
announcements.
This model is extensively studied in economics since the work of Aumann (1976) and
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982). It is known that the agents eventually agree with
high probability on any network. It is often argued that the computations needed by agents
in this model are difficult, but prior to our results there was no rigorous work showing this
hardness.
We show that it is PSPACE-hard for the agents to compute their actions in this model.
Furthermore, we show that it is equally difficult even to approximate an agent’s posterior: It
is PSPACE-hard to distinguish between the posterior being almost entirely concentrated on
one state of the world or another.
1 Introduction
Background The problem of dynamic opinion exchange is an important field of study in eco-
nomics, with its roots reaching as far as the Condorcet’s jury theorem and, in the Bayesian context,
Aumann’s agreement theorem. Economists use different opinion exchange models as inspiration
for explaining interactions and decisions of market participants. More generally, there is extensive
interest in studying how social agents exchange information, form opinions and use them as a
basis to make decisions. For a more comprehensive introduction to the subject we refer to surveys
addressed to economists [AO11] and mathematicians [MT17].
Many models have been proposed and researched, with the properties studied including, among
others, if the agents converge to the same opinion, the rate of such convergence, and if the consensus
decision is optimal with high probability (this is called learning). Two interesting aspects of the
differences between models are rules for updating agents’ opinions (e.g., fully rational or heuristic)
and presence of network structure.
For example, in settings where the updates are assumed to be rational (Bayesian), there is exten-
sive study of models where the agents act in sequence (see, e.g., [Ban92, BHW92, SS00, ADLO11]
for a non-exhaustive selection of works that consider phenomena of herding and information cas-
cades), as well as models with agents arranged in a network and repeatedly exchanging opinions as
time progresses (see some references below). In this work we are interested in the network models,
arguably becoming more and more relevant given the ubiquity of networks in modern society.
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On the other hand, similar questions are studied for models with so-called bounded rationality,
where the Bayesian updates are replaced with simpler, heuristic rules. Some well-known examples
include DeGroot model [DeG74, GJ10], the voter model [CS73, HL75] and other related variants
[BG98, AOP10].
One commonly accepted reason for studying bounded rationality is that, especially in the net-
work case, Bayesian updates become so complicated as to make fully rational behavior intractable,
and therefore unrealistic. However, we are not aware of previous theoretical evidence or formaliza-
tion of that assertion. Together with another paper of the same authors addressed to economists
[HJMR18], we consider this work as a development in that direction.
More precisely, we show that computing an agent’s opinion in one of the most important
and studied Bayesian network models is PSPACE-hard. Furthermore, it is PSPACE-hard even to
approximate the rational opinion in any meaningful way. This improves on our NP-hardness result
for the same problem shown in [HJMR18].
Our model and results We are concerned with a certain Bayesian model of opinion exchange
and reaching agreement on a network. We are going to call it the (Bayesian) binary action model.
The idea is that there is a network of honest, fully rational agents trying to learn a binary piece
of information, e.g., will the price of an asset go up or down, or which political party’s policies
are more beneficial to the society. We call this information the state of the world. Initially, each
agent receives an independent piece of information (a private signal) that is correlated with the
state of the world. According to the principle that “actions speak louder than words”, at every
time step the agents reveal to their neighbors which of the two possible states they consider more
likely. On the other hand, we assume that the agents are honest truth-seekers and always truthfully
reveal their preferred state: According to economic terminology they act myopically rather than
strategically.
More specifically, we assume that the state of the world is encoded in a random variable
θ ∈ {T,F} (standing for True and False), distributed according to a uniform prior, shared by all
agents. A set of Bayesian agents arranged on a directed graph G = (V,E) performs a sequence of
actions at discrete times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . Before the process starts, each agent u receives a random
private signal S(u) ∈ {0, 1}. The collection of random variables {S(u) : u ∈ V } is independent
conditioned on θ. The idea is that S(u) = 1 indicates a piece of evidence for θ = T and S(u) = 0
is evidence favoring θ = F.
At each time t ≥ 0, the agents simultaneously broadcast actions to their neighbors in G. The
action A(u, t) ∈ {T,F} is the best guess for the state of the world by agent u at time t: Letting
µ(u, t) be the respective Bayesian posterior probability that θ = T, the action A(u, t) = T if and
only if µ(u, t) > 1/2. In subsequent steps, agents update their posteriors based on their neighbors’
actions (we assume that everyone is rational, and that this fact and the description of the model
are common knowledge) and broadcast updated actions. The process continues indefinitely.
We are interested in computational resources required for the agents to participate in the process
described above. That is, we consider complexity of computing the action A(u, t) given the private
signal S(u) and history of observations {A(v, t′) : v ∈ N (u), t′ < t}, where N (u) denotes the set
of neighbors of u in G. Our main result is that it is worst-case PSPACE-hard for an agent to
distinguish between cases where µ(u, t) ≥ 1 − exp(−Θ(N)) and µ(u, t) ≤ exp(−Θ(N)), where N
is a naturally defined size of the problem. As a consequence, it is PSPACE-hard to compute the
action A(u, t).
Note a hardness of approximation aspect of our result: A priori one can imagine a reduction
where it is difficult to compute the action A(u, t) when the Bayesian posterior is close to the
threshold µ(u, t) ≈ 1/2. However, we demonstrate that it is already hard to distinguish between
situations where the posterior is concentrated on one of the extreme values µ(u, t) ≈ 0 (and
therefore almost certainly θ = F) and µ(u, t) ≈ 1 (and therefore θ = T).
Our hardness results carry over to other models. In particular, they extend to the case where
the signals are continuous, where the prior state of the world is not uniform etc. We also note that
we may assume that the agents are never tied or close to tied in their posteriors, see Remark 13
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for more details.
A good deal is known about the model we are considering. From a paper by Gale and
Kariv [GK03] (with an error corrected by Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [RSV09], see also simi-
lar analysis of earlier, related models in [BV82, TA84]) it follows that if the network G is strongly
connected, then the agents eventually converge to the same action (or they become indifferent).
The work of Geanakoplos [Gea94] implies that this agreement is reached in at most |V | · 2|V | time
steps. Furthermore, Mossel, Sly and Tamuz [MST14] showed that in large undirected networks
with non-atomic signals, learning occurs: The common agreed action is equal to the state of the
world θ, except with probability that goes to zero with the number of agents. A good deal remains
open, too. For example, it is not known if the |V | · 2|V | bound on the agreement speed can be
improved. In this context is also interesting to note the results of [MOT16] who consider a special
model with Gaussian structure and revealed beliefs. In contrast to the results presented here, it
is shown that in this case, agents’ computations are efficient (polynomial time) and convergence
time is O(|V | · diam(G)).
Proof idea Our proof is by direct reduction from the canonical PSPACE-complete language of
true quantified Boolean formulas. It maps true formulas onto networks where one of the agents’
posteriors is almost entirely concentrated on θ = T and false formulas onto networks where the
posterior is concentrated on θ = F. The reduction and the proof are by induction on the number
of quantifier alternations in the Boolean formula. The base case of the induction corresponds to
such mapping for satisfiable and unsatisfiable 3-SAT instances.
The basic idea of the reduction is to map variables and clauses of the Boolean formula onto
agents or small sub-networks of agents (gadgets) in the Bayesian network. We use other gadgets to
implement some useful procedures, like counting or logical operations. One challenging aspect of
the reduction is that, since each such operation is implemented by Bayesian agents by broadcasting
their opinions, these “measurements” themselves might shift the posterior belief of the “observer”
agent. Therefore, we need to carefully compensate those unintended effects at every step.
Another interesting technical aspect of the proof is related to its recursive nature. When we
establish hardness of approximation for k quantifier alternations, it means that we can place an
agent in our network such that the agent will be solving a “k-hard” computational problem. We
then use this agent, together with another gadget that modifies relative likelihoods of different
private signal configurations, to amplify hardness to k + 1 alternations.
Related literature One intriguing aspect of our result is a connection to the Aumann’s agree-
ment theorem. There is a well-known discrepancy (see [CH02] for a distinctive take) between
reality, where we commonly observe (presumably) honest, well-meaning people “agreeing to dis-
agree”, and the Aumann’s theorem, stating that this cannot happen for Bayesian agents with
common priors and knowledge, i.e., the agents will always end up with the same estimate of the
state of the world after exchanging all relevant information. Our result hints at a computational
explanation, suggesting that reasonable agreement protocols might be intractable in the presence of
network structure. This is notwithstanding some positive computational results by Hanson [Han03]
and Aaronson [Aar05], which focus on two agents and come with their own (perhaps unavoidable)
caveats.
We find it interesting that the agents’ computations in the binary action model turn out to
be not just hard, but PSPACE-hard. PSPACE-hardness of partially observed Markov decision
processes (PMODPs) established by Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis [PT87] seems to be a result of
similar kind. On the other hand, there are clear differences: We do not see how to implement
our model as PMODP, and embedding a TQBF instance in a PMODP looks more straightforward
than what happens in our reduction. Furthermore, and contrary to [PT87], we establish hardness
of approximation. We are not aware of many other PSPACE-hardness of approximation proofs,
especially in recent years. Exceptions are results obtained via PSPACE versions of the PCP theorem
[CFLS95, CFLS97] and a few other reductions [MHR94, HMS94, Jon97, Jon99] that concern,
among others, some problems on hierarchically generated graphs and an AI-motivated problem of
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planning in propositional logic.
We note that there are some results on hardness of Bayesian reasoning in static networks in
the AI and cognitive science context (see [Kwi18] and its references), but this setting seems quite
different from dynamic opinion exchange models.
Finally, we observe that a natural exhaustive search algorithm for computing the action A(u, t)
in the binary action model requires exponential space (see [HJMR18] for a description) and that we
are not aware of a faster, general method (but again, see [MOT16] for a polynomial time algorithm
in a variant with Gaussian signals).
Organization of the paper In Section 2 we give a full description of our model, state the results
precisely and give some remarks about the proofs. Section 3 contains the proof of NP-hardness,
which is then used in Section 4 in the proof of PSPACE-hardness. Section 5 modifies the proof to
use only a fixed number of private signal distributions. Section 6 provides a proof of #P-hardness
in a related revealed belief model. Finally, Section 7 contains some suggestions for future work.
2 The model and our results
In Section 2.1 we restate the binary action model in more precise terms and introduce some
notation. In Section 2.2 we discuss our results in this model. In Section 2.3 we define the revealed
belief model and state a #P-hardness result for it. Finally, in Section 2.4 we explain our main
proof ideas.
2.1 Binary action model
We consider the binary action model of Bayesian opinion exchange on a network. There is a
directed graph G = (V,E), the vertices of which we call agents. The world has a hidden binary
state θ ∈ {T,F} with uniform prior distribution. We will analyze a process with discrete moments
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . At time t = 0 each agent u receives a private signal S(u) ∈ {0, 1}. The signals S(u)
are random variables with distributions that are independent across agents after conditioning on
θ. Accordingly, the distribution of S(u) is determined by its signal probabilities
pθ0(u) := Pr [S(u) = 1 | θ = θ0] , θ0 ∈ {T,F} .
Equivalently, it is determined by its (log)-likelihoods
`b(u) = ln
Pr[S(u) = b | θ = T]
Pr[S(u) = b | θ = F] = ln
Pr[θ = T | S(u) = b]
Pr[θ = F | S(u) = b] , b ∈ {0, 1} .
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between probabilities pT and pF with pT 6= pF, and
likelihoods `0, `1 with `0 ·`1 < 0. We will always assume that a signal S(u) = 1 is evidence towards
θ = T and vice versa. This is equivalent to saying that pT > pF or `1 > 0 and `0 < 0. We allow
some agents to not receive private signals: This can be “simulated” by giving them non-informative
signals with pT(u) = pF(u). We will refer to all signal probabilities taken together as the signal
structure of the Bayesian network. A specific pattern of signals s ∈ {0, 1}|V ′| (where V ′ denotes
the subset of agents that receive informative signals) will be called a signal configuration.
We assume that all this structural information is publicly known, but the agents do not have
direct access to θ or others’ private signals. Agents are presumed to be rational, to know that
everyone else is rational, to know that everyone knows, etc. (common knowledge of rationality).
At each time t ≥ 0, we define µ(u, t) to be the belief of agent u: The conditional probability
that θ = T given everything that u observed at times t′ < t. More precisely, letting N (u) be the
(out)neighbors of u in G and defining
H(u, t) := {A(v, t′) : t′ < t, v ∈ N (u)} .
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as the observation history of agent u we let
µ(u, t) := Pr[θ = T | S(u), H(u, t)] .
Accordingly, if (u, v) ∈ E(G) we will say that agent u observes agent v.
Agent u broadcasts to its in-neighbors the action A(u, t) ∈ {T,F}, which is the state of the
world that u considers more likely according to µ(u, t) (assume that ties are broken in an arbitrary
deterministic manner, say, in favor of F). Then, the protocol proceeds to time step t + 1 and
the agents update their beliefs and broadcast updated actions. The process continues indefinitely.
Note that the beliefs and actions become deterministic once the private signals are fixed.
The first two time steps of the process are relatively easy to understand: At time t = 0 an
agent broadcasts A(u, 0) = T if and only if S(u) = 1 and the belief µ(u, 1) can be easily computed
from the likelihood `S(u)(u). At time t = 1, an agent broadcasts A(u, 1) = T if and only if
`S(u)(u) +
∑
v∈N (u)
`S(v)(v) > 0 , (1)
where the private signals S(v) can be inferred from observed actions A(v, 0). The sum (1) deter-
mines the likelihood associated with belief µ(u, 1). However, at later times the actions of different
neighbors are not independent anymore and accounting for those dependencies seems difficult.
Let Π be a Bayesian network, i.e., a directed graph G = (V,E) together with the signal
structure. We do not commit to any particular representation of probabilities of private signals.
Our reduction remains valid for any reasonable choice. We are interested in hardness of computing
the actions that the agents need to broadcast. More precisely, we consider complexity of computing
the function
BINARY-ACTION(Π, t, u, S(u), H(u, t)) := A(u, t)
that computes the action A(u, t) given the Bayesian network, time t, agent u, its private signal
S(u) and observation history H(u, t). Relatedly, we will consider computing belief
BINARY-BELIEF(Π, t, u, S(u), H(u, t)) := µ(u, t) .
Note that computing BINARY-ACTION is equivalent to distinguishing between BINARY-BELIEF >
1/2 and BINARY-BELIEF ≤ 1/2.
2.2 Our results
Our first result implies that computing BINARY-ACTION at time t = 2 is NP-hard. We present
it as a standalone theorem, since the NP reduction and its analysis are used as a building block in
the more complicated PSPACE reduction.
Theorem 1. There exists an efficient reduction from a 3-SAT formula φ with N variables and M
clauses to an input of BINARY-ACTION(Π, t, u,H(u, t)) such that:
• The size (number of agents and edges) of Bayesian graph G is O(N + M), time is set to
t = 2 and agent u does not receive a private signal.
• All probabilities of private signals are efficiently computable real numbers satisfying
exp(−(O(N)) ≤ pθ0(v) ≤ 1− exp(−O(N)), v ∈ V, θ0 ∈ {T,F} .
• If φ is satisfiable, then the posterior µ(u, 2) satisfies
µ(u, 2) = 1− exp(−Θ(N)) .
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• If φ is not satisfiable, then we have
µ(u, 2) = exp(−Θ(N)) .
Corollary 2. Both distinguishing between BINARY-BELIEF > 1−exp(−O(N)) and BINARY-BELIEF <
exp(−O(N)) and computing BINARY-ACTION are NP-hard.
Our main result improves Theorem 1 to PSPACE-hardness. It is a direct reduction from the
canonical PSPACE-complete language of true quantified Boolean formulas TQBF.
Theorem 3. There exists an efficient reduction from a TQBF formula Φ
Φ = QKxK · · · ∃x1φ(xK , . . . , x1) ,
where φ is a 3-CNF formula with N variables andM clauses, there are K variable blocks with alter-
nating quantifiers and the last quantifier is existential, to an input of BINARY-ACTION(Π, t, u,H(u, t))
such that:
• The number of agents in Bayesian graph G is O(N2(N + M)), time is set to t = 2K and
agent u does not receive a private signal.
• All probabilities of private signals are efficiently computable real numbers satisfying
exp(−(O(N)) ≤ pθ0(v) ≤ 1− exp(−O(N)), v ∈ V, θ0 ∈ {T,F} . (2)
• If Φ is true, then µ(u, 2K) = 1− exp(−Θ(N)). If Φ is false, then µ(u, 2K) = exp(−Θ(N)).
Corollary 4. Both distinguishing between BINARY-BELIEF > 1−exp(−O(N)) and BINARY-BELIEF <
exp(−O(N)) and computing BINARY-ACTION are PSPACE-hard.
Remark 5. Note that the statement of Theorem 3 immediately gives ΣK- and ΠK-hardness of
approximating BINARY-BELIEF at time t = 2K. ♦
Remark 6. For ease of exposition we define networks in the reductions to be directed, but due to
additional structure that we impose (see paragraph “Network structure and significant times” in
Section 3) it is easy to see that they can be assumed to be undirected. This is relevant insofar as
a strong form of learning occurs only on undirected graphs (see [MST14] for details). ♦
One possible objection to Theorem 3 is that it uses signal distributions with probabilities
exponentially close to zero and one. We do not think this is a significant issue, and it helps
avoid some technicalities. Nevertheless, in Section 5 we prove a version of Theorem 3 where all
private signals come from a fixed family of say, at most fifty distributions. This is at the cost of
(non-asymptotic) increase in the size of the graph.
Theorem 7. The reduction from Theorem 3 can be modified such that all private signals come
from a fixed family of at most fifty distributions.
Remark 8. It is possible to modify our proofs to give hardness of distinguishing between µ(u, t) ≤
exp(−O(NK)) and µ(u, t) ≥ 1 − exp(−O(NK)) for any constant K (recall that N is the number
of variables in the formula φ). This is at the cost of allowing signal probabilities in the range
exp(−(O(NK)) ≤ pθ0(v) ≤ 1− exp(−O(NK))
or, in the bounded signal case, increasing the network size to O(NK+2). Consequently, in the
latter case we get hardness of approximation up to exp(−O(|V |α)) factor for any constant α < 1,
where |V | is the number of agents. ♦
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2.3 Revealed beliefs
In a natural variant of our model the agents act in exactly the same manner, except that they
reveal their full beliefs A(u, t) = µ(u, t) rather than just estimates of the state θ. Accordingly, we
call it the revealed belief model. We suspect that binary action and revealed belief models have
similar computational powers. Furthermore, we conjecture that if the agents broadcast their beliefs
rounded to a (fixed in advance) polynomial number of significant digits, then our techniques can
be extended to establish a similar PSPACE-hardness result.
However, if one instead assumes that the beliefs are broadcast up to an arbitrary precision,
our proof fails for a rather annoying reason: When implementing alternation from NP to Π2 in
the binary action model, if a formula φ has no satisfying assignments, we can exactly compute the
belief of the NP observer agent. However, in case φ has a satisfying assignment, we can compute
the belief only with high, but imperfect precision. The reason is that the exact value of the belief
depends on the number of satisfying assignments of φ. This imperfection can be “rounded away”
if the agents output a discrete guess for θ, but we do not know how to handle it if the beliefs are
broadcast exactly.
Nevertheless, in Section 6 we present a #P-hardness proof in the revealed belief model. The
proof is by reduction from counting satisfying assignments in a 2-SAT formula. However, since
the differences in the posterior corresponding to different numbers of satisfying assignments are
small, it is not clear if they can be amplified, and consequently we do not demonstrate hardness of
approximation (similar as in [PT87]). For ease of exposition we introduce an additional relaxation
to the model by allowing some agents to receive ternary private signals.
Theorem 9. Assume the revealed belief model with beliefs transmitted up to arbitrary precision
and call the respective computational problem BINARY-BELIEF. Additionally, assume that some
agents receive ternary signals S(u) ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
There exists an efficient reduction that maps a 2-SAT formula φ with N variables, M clauses
and A satisfying assignments to an instance of BINARY-BELIEF(Π, t, u,H(u, t)) such that:
• Bayesian network G has size O(N +M), time is set to t = 2 and agent u does not receive a
private signal.
• All private signal probabilities come from a fixed family of at most ten distributions.
• The likelihood of u at time t = 2 satisfies
A
2N
(
1− 14N
)
≤ µ(u, 2)1− µ(u, 2) ≤
A
2N
(
1 + 14N
)
.
In particular, rounding this likelihood to the nearest multiple of 2−N yields A ·2−N and allows
to recover A.
2.4 Main proof ideas
The NP-hardness proof (in Section 3) uses an analysis of a composition of several gadgets. We
will think of the agent u from input to BINARY-ACTION as “observer” and accordingly call it
OBS. The Bayesian network features gadgets that represent variables and clauses. The private
signals in variable gadgets correspond to assignments x to the formula φ. Furthermore, there is
an “evaluation agent” EVAL that interacts with all clause gadgets. We use more gadgets that
“implement” counting to ensure that what OBS observes is consistent with one of two possible
kinds of signal configurations:
• S(EVAL) = 1 and the signals of variable agents correspond to an arbitrary assignment x.
• S(EVAL) = 0 and the signals of variable agents correspond to a satisfying assignment x.
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Then, we use another gadget to “amplify” the information that is conveyed about the state of the
world by the signal S(EVAL). If φ has no satisfying assignment, then S(EVAL) = 1 and this becomes
amplified to a near-certainty that θ = F (for technical reasons this is the opposite conclusion than
suggested by S(EVAL) = 1). On the other hand, we design the signal structure such that even a
single satisfying assignment tips the scales and amplifies to θ = T with high probability (whp).
We note that one technical challenge in executing this plan is that some of our gadgets are
designed to “measure” (e.g., count) certain properties of the network, but these measurements use
auxiliary agents with their own private signals, affecting Bayesian posteriors. We need to be careful
to cancel out these unintended effects at every step.
The high-level idea to improve on the NP-hardness proof is that once we know that agents can
solve hard problems, we can use them to help the observer agent solve an even harder problem.
Of course this has to be done in a careful way, since the answer to a partial problem cannot be
directly revealed to the observer (the whole point is that we do not know a priori what this answer
is).
The PSPACE reduction is defined and Theorem 3 proved by induction. The base case is the
Bayesian network from Theorem 1, but with observer agent directly observing private signals
in the first K − 1 variable blocks. Then, we proceed to add “intermediate observers”, each of
them observing one variable block less, and interacting via a gadget with the previous observer to
implement the quantifier alternation by adjusting likelihoods of different assignments to variables
in Φ.
It is useful to view Φ as a game where two players set quantified variables (proceeding left-to-
right) in Φ. One player sets variables under existential quantifiers with the objective of evaluating
the 3-CNF formula φ true. The other player sets variables under universal quantifiers with the
objective of evaluating φ false. Under that interpretation, our reduction has the following property:
The final observer agent OBS concludes that the assignment x formed by private signals with high
probability corresponds to a “game transcript” in the game played according to a winning strategy.
Depending on which player has the winning strategy, the state of the world is either T or F whp.
3 NP-hardness: Proof of Theorem 1
We start with the NP-hardness result by reduction from 3-SAT. The reduction is used as a building
block in the PSPACE-hardness proof, but it is also useful in terms of developing intuition for the
more technical proof of Theorem 3. We proceed by explaining gadgets that we use, describing how
to put them together in the full reduction and proving the correctness.
Threshold gadget Say there are agents v1, . . . , vK that do not observe anyone and receive
private signals S(vi) with respective likelihoods `0(vi) and `1(vi). Additionally, there is an observer
agent OBS and we would like to reveal to it, at time t = 1, that the sum of likelihoods of agents
v1, . . . , vK exceeds some threshold δ:
L :=
K∑
i=1
`S(vi)(vi) > δ ,
without disclosing anything else about the private signals.1 This is achieved by the gadget in
Figure 1.
We describe the gadget for δ > 0. Agent B receives private signal with `0(B) = −δ (and
arbitrary `1(B)) and agent C with `1(C) = δ. Agents A, D1 and D2 (we will call the latter two
the “dummy” agents) do not receive private signals. Our overall reduction will demonstrate the
hardness of computation for agent OBS. Therefore, we need to specify the observation history of
OBS. By our tie-breaking convention, it must be A(A, 0) = A(D1, 0) = A(D2, 0) = F. Furthermore,
we specify A(A, 1) = A(D2, 1) = T and A(D1, 1) = F.
1 We assume that δ is chosen such that L = δ never happens.
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Figure 1: Threshold gadget.
v1
`0(v1)
`1(v1)
v2
`0(v2)
`1(v2)
· · · vK
`0(vK)
`1(vK)
B
−δ
C
δ
A D1 D2
OBS
Based on that information, agent OBS can infer that S(B) = 0, S(C) = 1 and, since the action
A(A, 2) is determined by the sign of L − δ, that L > δ. The purpose of agent C is to counteract
the effect of this “measurement” on the estimate of the state of the world by OBS. More precisely,
let
P (s1, . . . , sK , θ0) := Pr
[
K∧
i=1
S(vi) = si ∧ θ = θ0
]
, (3)
P (s1, . . . , sK , sB , sC , θ0) := Pr
[
K∧
i=1
S(vi) = si ∧ S(B) = sB ∧ S(C) = sC ∧ θ = θ0
]
. (4)
Based on the discussion above, we have the following:
Claim 10. Let s1, . . . , sK be private signals of v1, . . . , vK . Similarly, let (sB , sC) be private signals
of B and C. Then:
• If ∑Ki=1 `si(vi) < α, then there are no (sB , sC) that make (s1, . . . , sK , sB , sC) consistent with
observations of OBS.
• If ∑Ki=1 `si(vi) > α, then there exists unique configuration (sB , sC) consistent with observa-
tions of OBS and the (prior) probability of this configuration when the state is θ0 is
P (s1, . . . , sK , sB , sC , θ0) = P (s1, . . . , sK , θ0) · α , (5)
where α := (1 − pT(B))pT(C) = e`0(B)+`1(C)(1 − pF(B))pF(C) = (1 − pF(B))pF(C) does not
depend on θ0.
Similar reasoning can be made for the case when δ < 0 and/or checking the opposite inequality
L < δ. We will say that an agent OBS observes a threshold gadget if it observes agents A, D1 and
D2 and denote it as shown in Figure 2. Note that in our diagrams we use circles to denote agents
and boxes to denote gadgets. The latter typically contain several auxiliary agents.
Network structure and significant times It might appear that the threshold gadget is more
complicated than needed. The reason for this is that we will impose certain additional structure
on the graph to facilitate its analysis, and later use it in the proof of Theorem 3. Specifically, we
will always make sure that the graph is a DAG, with only the observer agent having in-degree
zero. All agents that receive private signals will have out-degree zero, and all agents with non-zero
out-degree will not receive private signals (recall a directed edge A→ B indicates that A observes
B).
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Figure 2: Notation for the threshold gadget.
v1 v2 · · · vK
> δ
OBS
Furthermore, we will arrange the graph such that each agent will learn new information at a
single, fixed time step. That is, for every agent A there will exist a significant time t(A) such
that µ(A, t) = 1/2 for t′ < t(A) and µ(A, t′) = µ(A, t(A)) for t′ > t(A). If A receives a private
signal, then t(A) = 0. Otherwise, t(A) is determined by the (unique) path length from A to an
out-degree zero agent. For example, in Figure 1 significant times are t(A) = t(D1) = t(D2) = 1
and t(OBS) = 2.
Accordingly, we will use notation µ(A) and A(A) to denote agent beliefs and actions at the
significant time. Let A and B be agents with t(A) < t(B)− 1. In the following, we will sometimes
say that B observes A, even though that would contradict the significant time requirement (a
direct edge B → A implies that t(A) = t(B) − 1). Whenever we do so, it should be understood
that there is a path of “dummy” nodes of appropriate length between A and B (cf. D1 and D2 in
Figure 1). For clarity, we will omit dummy nodes from the figures.
Counting gadget Assume now that the agents v1, . . . , vK receive private signals with identical
likelihoods `0 < 0 and `1 > 0 and that a number k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K is given. Then, building on the
threshold gadget, it is easy to convey the information that exactly k out of K agents received
private signal 1. Letting δ := K`0 + (k − 0.5)(`1 − `0) and δ′ := δ + `1 − `0, we compose two
threshold gadgets as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Counting gadget.
v1
`0, `1
· · · vK
`0, `1
> δ < δ′
A
−K`0 − k(`1 − `0)
OBS
Agent A is optional: Depending on our needs we will use the counting gadget with or without
it. It is used to preserve the original belief of OBS after learning the count of private signals of
agents vi. It receives a private signal with `b(A) := ` := −K`0 − k(`1 − `0) for appropriate b
(depending on the sign of `) and broadcasts the corresponding state θ0. By similar analysis as for
the threshold gadget and using the P (·) notation as in (3)–(5) we have:
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Claim 11. Let s1, . . . , sK be private signals of agents v1, . . . , vK . Let s represent private signals
of all auxiliary agents in the threshold gadgets and sA a private signal of agent A.
Then, the only configurations s1, . . . , sK consistent with observations of OBS are those for which∑K
i=1 si = k. Furthermore, for any such configuration there exists a unique configuration s (and
sA, if agent A is present) such that (depending on the presence of A):
P (s1, . . . , sK , s, θ0) = P (s1, . . . , sK , θ0) · α = P (θ0) · α ,
P (s1, . . . , sK , s, sA, θ0) = β ,
where α := α(k,K, `0, `1) > 0 is easily computable and does not depend on s1, . . . , sK or θ0, but the
value of the other term P (θ0) is in general dependent on θ0. On the other hand, if A is present,
then β := β(k,K, `0, `1) > 0 does not depend at all on private signals or state of the world.
If agent A is omitted, the same technique can be used to obtain inequalities (e.g., checking that
at least k out of K private signals are ones). We will say that an agent OBS observes the counting
gadget if it observes both respective threshold gadgets (and A, if present). We will denote counting
gadgets as in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Two counting gadgets illustrating the notation. The left-hand gadget ensures that at
least k agents received ones. The right-hand gadget ensures that exactly k agents received ones.
Furthermore, the equivalence symbol on the right-hand gadget denotes presence of the optional
agent A.
u1 · · · uK
≥ k
v1 · · · vK
= k≡
OBS
Not-equal gadget Another related gadget that we will use reveals to the observer that two
agents u, v with likelihoods `0, `1 and m0,m1, respectively, receive opposite signals S(u) 6= S(v).
Since `0 < `1 and m0 < m1, this is achieved by using two threshold gadgets to check that
`0 +m0 < `S(u) +mS(v) < `1 +m1 ,
where we set the thresholds in the threshold gadgets as `0 + m0 + ε and `1 + m1 − ε for an
appropriately small ε > 0. We will denote the not-equal gadget as in Figure 5.
Variable and clause gadgets Our reduction is from the standard form of 3-SAT, where we
are given a CNF formula on N variables x1, . . . , xN . The formula is a conjunction of M clauses
C1, . . . , CM , where each clause is a disjunction of exactly three literals on distinct variables.
We introduce two global agents. One of them is called OBS and we mean it as an “observer
agent”. This is the agent for which we establish hardness of computation. We will follow the rule
that OBS observes all gadgets that are present in the network. Second, we place an “evaluation
agent” EVAL with private signals pT := 0.9 and pF := 0.4.
Furthermore, for each variable in the CNF formula, we introduce two agents xi and ¬xi that
receive private signals given by pT and pF. Then, we encompass those two agents in a counting
gadget as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 5: Notation for not-equal gadget.
u v
6=
OBS
Figure 6: Variable gadget.
xi ¬xi
= 1≡
OBS
Then, for each clause Ci, we introduce a counting gadget on four agents: Three agents cor-
responding to the literals in the clause (note that they are observed directly and not through
the variable gadgets), and the EVAL agent. The gadget ensures that at least one of those agents
received signal 1. Illustration is provided in Figure 7.
The reduction We put the agents EVAL and OBS and the variable and clause gadgets together,
as explained in previous paragraphs. Finally, we add two more agents A and B. We will choose a
natural number b := C ·N for an absolute big enough constant C > 0. Agent A receives private
signals with pT(A) = 1 − αb1 and pF(A) = αb2 and agent B with pT(B) = 1 − αb3 and pF(B) = αb4
for some α1, . . . , α4 that we will choose shortly. Let the corresponding likelihoods be o1, o2, o3, o4
(note that o1, o3 > 0 and o2, o4 < 0). We also insert two not-equal gadgets observed by OBS: One
of them is put between EVAL and A and the other one between A and B. The overall construction
is illustrated in Figure 8.
We are reducing to the problem of computing the action of agent OBS at its significant time
t = 2. Note that OBS observes all gadgets in the graph, and only gadgets. In particular, OBS
directly infers the signals of all auxiliary agents in the gadgets, but the same cannot be said about
the private signals of variable agents. The observation history H(OBS, 2) is naturally determined
by specifications of the gadgets.
Analysis As a preliminary matter, the reduction indeed produces an instance of polynomial size:
The size of the graph is O(N +M) and the probabilities of private signals satisfy
exp(−O(N)) ≤ pθ0(u) ≤ 1− exp(−O(N)) .
We inspect the construction to understand which private signal configurations are consistent
with the observation history of agent OBS. First, the signals of all auxiliary agents in the gadgets
can be directly inferred by OBS. With that in mind, fix a sequence of private signals to vari-
able agents S(x1), . . . , S(xn). Abusing notation, we identify such sequence with an assignment
12
Figure 7: Clause gadget.
Ci = ¬x1 ∨ x3 ∨ ¬xN
¬x1 x3 ¬xN EVAL
OBS
≥ 1
Figure 8: 3-SAT reduction for φ(x) = C1 ∧ . . . ∧ CM .
x1 · · · xN
C1 · · · CM
EVAL
`1, `0
A
o1, o2
B
o3, o4
6= 6=
OBS
x1, . . . , xn in a natural way. Variable gadgets ensure that each “negation agent” received the op-
posite signal S(¬xi) = 1 − S(xi). Moreover, due to clause and not-equal gadgets we have the
following:
Claim 12.
• For every assignment x = (x1, . . . , xn), there exists exactly one consistent configuration of
private signals with S(EVAL) = 1, S(A) = 0, S(B) = 1.
• For every satisfying assignment x, there exists exactly one consistent configuration of private
signals with S(EVAL) = 0, S(A) = 1, S(B) = 0.
• There are no other consistent configurations.
As a next step, we compare the likelihoods of configurations corresponding to different as-
signments. To this end, we let the quantity P (x, S0, θ0) be the a priori probability that pri-
vate signals are in the consistent configuration corresponding to assignment x, S(EVAL) = S0
and θ = θ0 (note that this is a different definition than given in (3)). Furthermore, we set
P (x, θ0) := P (x, 0, θ0) + P (x, 1, θ0).
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By inspecting the construction in a similar way as in Claims 10 and 11 we observe that, for
any assignment x:
P (x, 1,T) = q · 0.9 · αb1 · (1− αb3) ,
P (x, 1,F) = q · 0.4 · (1− αb2) · αb4
for some q(N,M) > 0 that does not depend on a specific assignment x. On the other hand, for
any satisfying assignment x we additionally have
P (x, 0,T) = q · 0.1 · (1− αb1) · αb3 ,
P (x, 0,F) = q · 0.6 · αb2 · (1− αb4) .
Each of those expressions is a product of four terms. The value q corresponds to the probabilities
of signals in variable agents and auxiliary agents in the gadgets. The other terms arise from private
signals of, respectively, EVAL, A and B.
We choose α3 := 0.9, α2 := α4 := 0.6, α1 := 0.4 and note that our choice of b = CN for large
enough C ensures that we can estimate2
P (x, 1,T) ∈ q · 0.4b ·
(
1± 1200N
)b
, (6)
P (x, 1,F) ∈ q · 0.6b ·
(
1± 1200N
)b
, (7)
and, for satisfying assignments,
P (x, 0,T) ∈ q · 0.9b ·
(
1± 1200N
)b
. (8)
P (x, 0,F) ∈ q · 0.6b ·
(
1± 1200N
)b
. (9)
This in turn implies that for a satisfying assignment we have
P (x,T) ∈ q · 0.9b ·
(
1± 1100N
)b
, P (x,F) ∈ q · 0.6b ·
(
1± 1100N
)b
, (10)
and for an unsatisfying one
P (x,T) ∈ q · 0.4b ·
(
1± 1100N
)b
, P (x,F) ∈ q · 0.6b ·
(
1± 1100N
)b
. (11)
Accordingly, if the formula φ has a satisfying assignment x∗, it must be that the belief of agent
OBS at the significant time t = 2 can be bounded by
1− µ(OBS) =
∑
x∈{0,1}N P (x,F)∑
x∈{0,1}N P (x,F) + P (x,T)
≤
∑
x∈{0,1}N P (x,F)
P (x∗,T) ≤
2N · 0.61b
0.89b ≤ 0.69
b . (12)
At the same time, this probability can be lower bounded as
1− µ(OBS) ≥ P (x
∗,F)∑
x∈{0,1}N P (x,T) + P (x,F)
≥ 0.59
b
2N+1 · 0.91b ≥ 0.64
b . (13)
If the formula φ is not satisfiable, a simpler computation taking into account only equation (11)
gives
µ(OBS) ∈ [0.64b, 0.69b] . (14)
Hence, µ(OBS) = 1− exp(−Θ(N)) if φ is satisfiable and µ(OBS) = exp(−Θ(N)) otherwise.
2 The bounds below are slightly better than needed in order to facilitate the proof of Theorem 3.
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Remark 13. There are some results and proofs about opinion exchange models that are sensitive
to the tie-breaking rule chosen (see, e.g., Example 3.46 in [MT17]). We claim that the reduction
described above (as well as other reductions in this paper) does not suffer from this problem.
Ideally, we would like to say that ties never arise in signal configurations that are consistent
with inputs to the reduction. This is seen to be true by inspection, with the following exception:
Agents that do not receive private signals are indifferent about the state of the world until their
significant time. We made this choice to simplify the exposition. Since significant times are common
knowledge, no agent places any weight on others’ actions before their significant time (regardless
of the tie-breaking rule used), and the analysis of the reduction is not affected in any way by this
fact.
That being said, the ties could be avoided altogether. For example, we could introduce an agent
EPS that is observed by everyone else at time t = 0, indicating the action A(EPS) = T and private
signal S(EPS) = 1 corresponding to the likelihood l1(EPS) = ε for a small constant ε > 0. Since
likelihoods arising in the analysis of our reduction are always bounded away from zero, ε can be
made small enough so that the agent EPS does not affect other agents’ actions at their significant
times. This almost takes care of the problem, except for the agents without private signals at time
t = 0 (since they will acquire information from EPS only at time t = 1). This can be solved by
giving each such agent u an informative private signal with likelihoods, say
`1(u) = −`0(u) = ε100|V | .
In that case u will output an action corresponding to its private signal at time t = 0, but its belief
due to private signal (and signals of all other non-informative agents that u observes) will become
dominated by belief of EPS at time t = 1. ♦
4 PSPACE-hardness: Proof of Theorem 3
TQBF and the high-level idea Recall that we will show PSPACE-hardness by reduction from
the canonical PSPACE-complete language TQBF. More precisely, we use a representation of quan-
tified Boolean formulas
Φ = QKxK · · ·Q1x1 : φ(xK , . . . , x1) ,
where:
• Qi is a quantifier such that Qi ∈ {∃,∀}, Qi 6= Qi+1 and Q1 = ∃.
• xK , . . . , x1 are blocks of variables such that their total count is |xK |+ . . .+ |x1| = N .
• φ is a propositional logical formula given in the 3-CNF form with M clauses.
The language TQBF consists of all formulas Φ that are true. It is common and useful to think of
Φ as defining a “position” in a game, where “Player 1” chooses values of variables under existential
quantifiers, “Player 0” chooses values of variables under universal quantifiers, and the objective of
Player s is to evaluate φ to the value s. Under that interpretation, Φ ∈ TQBF if and only if Player
1 has a winning strategy in the given position.
Keeping that in mind, we can give an intuition for the proof: In the 3-SAT reduction, if
the formula had a satisfying assignment, then agent OBS could conclude whp. that the “hidden”
assignment is satisfying, and θ = T. Otherwise, the hidden assignment is not satisfying and θ = F
whp. In the PSPACE reduction, the hidden assignment will correspond (whp.) to a “transcript” of
the game played according to a winning strategy for one of the players, and θ will be determined
by the winning player. This will be achieved by implementing a sequence of observer agents
OBS1, . . . ,OBSK , where:
• Ultimately, the hardness will be shown for the computation of agent OBSK .
15
• Agent OBSi directly observes variable agents in blocks xK , . . . , xi+1.
• For each i, there is a (slightly more complicated) gadget similar to the “(EVAL, A,B)-gadget”
employed in the 3-SAT reduction. This gadget involves OBSi−1 as well as two new agents
Ai and Bi and is observed by OBSi. Its purpose is to “flip” relative likelihoods of different
types of variable assignments to implement a quantifier switch.
The reduction Recall our formula
Φ = QKxK · · · ∃x1 : φ(xK , . . . , x1) .
The reduction is defined inductively, with the overall structure illustrated in Figure 10. First, we
make a network identical to the one used used in 3-SAT reduction for the formula φ(xK , . . . , x1)
(i.e., as if all variables were existential). We call the observer agent OBS1 and introduce one
difference: OBS1 additionally directly observes all variable agents in variable blocks xK , . . . , x2.
Next, for each 1 < i ≤ k we place two agents Ai and Bi with private signals according to
probabilities pT(Ai) := 1− αb1, pF(Ai) := αb2, pT(Bi) := 1− αb3, pF(Bi) := αb4. The parameter b is
the same as in the 3-SAT reduction, i.e., b = C ·N for some absolute C big enough. The αj values
depend on the parity of i and are provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Values of αj for even and odd i.
even i odd i
α1
4
9 · 0.9 0.9
α2 0.9 49 · 0.9
α3 0.9 49 · 0.9
α4
4
9 · 0.9 0.9
δ for “large” threshold 0.2b b
δ for “small” threshold −b −0.2b
We place a not-equal gadget between Ai and Bi. This agent will be observed by OBSi. We
would also like to place a not-equal gadget between OBSi−1 and Ai. More precisely, we want a
gadget that will reveal that relevant actions are different: A(OBSi−1) 6= A(Ai). We cannot use
the standard not-equal gadget directly, since OBSi−1 receives more complicated information than
a single private signal. We now describe how to overcome this difficulty, with an illustration in
Figure 9.
We put in place a gadget with a structure analogous to the not-equal gadget between OBSi−1
and Ai. We will call it a modified not-equal gadget. It consists of two modified threshold gadgets.
One of those gadgets ensures that A(OBSi−1) 6= T or A(Ai) 6= T (we will call it a “large” threshold),
and the other one ensures that A(OBSi−1) 6= F or A(Ai) 6= F (this is a “small” threshold). Of
course the conjunction of those two guarantees is equivalent to A(OBSi−1) 6= A(Ai). Since the
analysis of two threshold gadgets is symmetric, we describe only the large threshold.
We call the main, “summing” agent of this threshold gadget Ti (it is an equivalent of A in
Figure 1). The agent Ti:
• Observes agents OBSi−1 and Ai.
• Additionally observes all agents that OBSi−1 observes.
• Except that it does not observe variable agents in variable block xi.
The significant time of agent OBSi−1 is t = 2i− 2 and we set significant time of Ti to t = 2i− 1.
Furthermore, we place two more agents T ′i and T ′′i corresponding to agents B and C in Figure 1.
Agent T ′i is observed by OBSi and Ti, and broadcasts likelihood −δ. Agent T ′′i is observed only
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Figure 9: Modified threshold agent illustrated on case i = K = 2 and formula Φ = ∀y∃x : φ(y, x) =
1. The gadget consists of nodes T1, T ′1 and T ′′1 . These three agents serve the role of A, B and
C from Figure 1 and are all observed by agent OBS2 (see Figure 10). The gadget implements
“not-equal” behavior between agents OBS1 and A2.
Red arrow emphasizes that agent OBS1 directly observes variable agents associated with y. Some
significant times and likelihoods are shown.
y x
φ
EVAL A B
6= 6=
OBS1
t = 2
A2
o1, o2
T1
t = 3
T ′1
−δ
T ′′1
δ
by OBSi and broadcasts likelihood δ. We still need to define the threshold value δ. This is not
immediate, since we only have bounds (12)–(14) on beliefs of agent OBSi−1, but it can be done.
Precise values for both large and small thresgholds are in Table 1.
Finally, we place an agent OBSi that observes the same agents as OBSi−1, except for variable
agents in variable block xi. Note that OBSi does not directly observe OBSi−1. Additionally, OBSi
observes the two not-equal gadgets defined above. It does not receive a private signal, and its
significant time is t = 2i.
This concludes the definition of the reduction. We show hardness for the computation of agent
OBSK at time t = 2K. Again, since this agent observes only gadgets, its observation history
is naturally determined by the semantics of the gadgets. We will show that the truth value of
formula Φ reduces to distinguishing between µ(OBSK) ≈ 1 and µ(OBSK) ≈ 0 and, by implication,
A(OBSK) = T and A(OBSK) = F.
Analysis: Preliminaries To start with, we note that the i-th stage of the inductive definition
adds O(i(N + M)) new agents (remembering that there are dummy agents that are not shown
in the figures). Consequently, the total number of agents is O(K2(N + M)) ≤ O(N2(N + M)).
Furthermore, the signal probabilities satisfy (2) by design.
To analyse the belief of agent OBSK , we need to start with more notation and definitions. For
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Figure 10: Schematic representation of the network in case K = 2 for formula Φ = ∀y∃x : φ(y, x) =
1. The agents and gadgets added in the inductive definition for i = 2 are marked in blue. For
clarity, edges from the modified not-equal gadget (cf. Figure 9, here marked with exclamation
point) are not shown.
y x
φ
EVAL
t = 0
A
t = 0
B
t = 0
6= 6=
OBS1
t = 2
A2
t = 2
B2
t = 2
! 6= 6=
OBS2
i > 1 and a partial assignment to variable blocks y := (yK , . . . , yi), let Φy be the formula
Φy := Qi−1xi−1 · · · ∃x1 : φ(yk, . . . , yi, xi−1, . . . , x1) ,
i.e., the original formula with “hard-coded” values of y.
Let Gi be the part of the network consisting of all agents created up to the i-th step of our
inductive definition. Therefore, G = GK ⊇ . . . ⊇ G1. The network was defined so that all actions
of agents in Gi depend only on private signals of agents in Gi. Furthermore, the belief µ(OBSi)
depends only on private signals of variable agents in xK , . . . , xi+1 and observations of gadgets by
OBSi (with the latter determined by the reduction, since OBSK observes all those gadgets as well).
We now need a careful definition in similar vein to P (x, θ0) from the 3-SAT reduction. Given
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ K, an assignment (y, x) := (yK , . . . , yi+1, xi, . . . , x1), as well as θ0 ∈ {T,F} we let
Pi(y, x, θ0) as the probability that all of the following hold:
1. For all gadgets observed by the agent OBSi, OBSi observed the actions given by the reduction.
2. The assignment determined by private signals of variable agents is equal to (y, x).
3. State of the world is θ = θ0.
One checks that Pi(y, x, θ0) depends only on private signals inGi. To gain intuition, the reader is in-
vited to convince themselves that, provided that the modified not-equal gadget ensuresA(OBSi−1) 6=
A(Ai) (we still need to prove that), Pi(y, x, θ0) is always a sum over probabilities of one (if
φ(y, x) = 0) or two (in case φ(y, x) = 1) signal configurations on Gi.
Finally, given y and α, ε ∈ (0, 1) we will say that state of the world θ0 is α-likely with error ε
if both
∃x : Pi(y, x, θ0) ≥ αb · (1− ε)b ,
∀x : Pi(y, x, θ0) ≤ αb · (1 + ε)b .
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The analysis proceeds by induction on the block number i, with a two-part invariant we need
to maintain. The first part says that, letting ε := i100N , there exists some β := β(i) ∈ (0, 1) such
that for every partial assignment y := (yK , . . . , yi+1):
1. If i is odd and Φy is true, then T is β-likely with error ε and F is 23β-likely with error ε.
2. If i is odd and Φy is false, then T is 49β-likely with error ε and F is
2
3β-likely with error ε.
3. Symmetrically, if i is even and Φy is true, then T is 23β-likely with error ε and F is
4
9β-likely
with error ε.
4. If i is even and Φy is false, then T is 23β-likely with error ε and F is β-likely with error ε.
The second part of the invariant states that whenever Φy is true, the belief of agent OBSi
satisfies 1 − µ(OBSi) ∈ [0.64b, 0.69b]. Similarly, if Φy is false, then this belief satisfies µ(OBSi) ∈
[0.64b, 0.69b]. Note that this part applied to i = K implies the last bullet point in the statement
of Theorem 3, with µ(OBSK) being within exp(−Θ(N)) distance to either zero or one.
Base case To establish the base case i = 1 one has to go through the proof in Section 3 and
convince themselves that the analysis stays valid even when the agent OBS directly observes
variable agents yK , . . . , y2. Then, the first invariant is established with
β(1) := q1/b · 0.9 ,
where q is the value featured in equations (10)-(11). For example, Φy being true means that the
respective 3-CNF formula φy(x) is satisfiable. Taking a satisfying assignment x, we get by (10)
P1(y, x,T) = P (x,T) ≥ q · 0.9b · (1− ε)b = βb · (1− ε)b ,
P1(y, x,F) = P (x,F) ≥ q · 0.6b · (1− ε)b =
(
2
3β
)b
· (1− ε)b .
On the other hand, by (10) and (11), for every assignment, satisfying or not, we have
P1(y, x,T) ≤ max
(
q · 0.9b · (1 + ε)b, q · 0.4b · (1 + ε)b) ≤ βb · (1 + ε)b ,
P1(y, x,F) ≤ q · 0.6b · (1 + ε)b =
(
2
3β
)b
· (1 + ε)b .
Similar computation gives the first invariant in case Φy is false, this time using only (11). The
second invariant is a direct consequence of equations (12)-(14).
Induction step We will analyze only even i, since the other case is analogous. Fix some y =
(yK , . . . , yi+1). In the following we assume that all actions observed in gadgets are as given by
the reduction and that private signals for the initial blocks of variables are given by y. Let us call
private signal configurations on Gi−1 that satisfy those conditions consistent.
In this setting, every assignment of private signals in the block yi determines the action
A(OBSi−1) and, by the second invariant, A(OBSi−1) = T if and only if Φy,yi is true. Accord-
ingly, we divide consistent configurations into “T-configurations” and “F-configurations”.
Our first objective is to show that the modified not-equal gadget (cf. Figure 10) ensures that
A(OBSi−1) 6= A(Ai). Let Ti be the main agent in a modified threshold gadget between OBSi−1
and Ai (cf. Figure 9). At its significant time t = 2i − 1, agent Ti observed everything that agent
OBSi−1 observed except for the assignment yi. It also observed the action A(OBSi−1) = θ0.
Therefore, the private signal configurations on Gi−1 consistent with observations of Ti are exactly
the θ0-configurations. We let
pOBS(θ0) := E [µ(OBSi−1)] ,
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where the expectation is over all θ0-configurations. By the second invariant, pOBS(θ0) is at a
distance between 0.64b and 0.69b to 1 or 0, depending on the value of θ0. Letm(θ0) := ln pOBS(θ0)1−pOBS(θ0) .
We check that
m(T) ∈ [0.37b, 0.45b], m(F) ∈ [−0.45b,−0.37b] . (15)
Recall that, outside of Gi−1, agent Ti observes actions (and infers private signals) of agents Ai
and T ′i . The likelihoods of Ai are given by
`T(Ai) = ln
1− αb1
αb2
= ln
1− ( 49 · 0.9)b
0.9b ∈ [0.1b, 0.11b]
`F(Ai) = ln
αb1
1− αb2
= ln
( 4
9 · 0.9
)b
1− 0.9b ∈ [−0.92b,−0.91b] .
The likelihood −δ of T ′i is given by Table 1. Let θ1 := A(OBSi−1) and θ2 := A(Ai). Since private
signals in Gi−1, Ai and T ′i are independent, it must be that A(Ti) = T if and only if
m(θ1) + `θ2(Ai)− δ > 0 . (16)
A calculation shows that the values in Table 1 ensure A(OBSi−1) 6= A(Ai). For example, for the
“large” threshold we have δ = 0.2b, so θ1 = θ2 = T gives
m(T) + `T(Ai)− δ > (0.37 + 0.1− 0.2) · b > 0 .
On the other hand, if θ1 6= T or θ2 6= T, then
m(θ1) + `θ2(Ai)− δ < (−0.26− 0.2) · b < 0 .
Performing a similar reasoning for the “small” threshold, we can conclude that in every consistent
configuration A(OBSi−1) 6= A(Ai), as well as A(Ai) 6= A(Bi). Therefore, every consistent signal
configuration on Gi−1 can be extended to a unique configuration on Gi that is consistent with
observations of OBSi. Consulting Table 1 again, we compute:
Φy,yi ∈ TQBF =⇒ Pi(y, yi, x;T) = Pi−1(y, yi, x;T) · q · αb1 · (1− αb3) (17)
∈ Pi−1(y, yi, x;T) · q ·
(
0.9 · 49
)b
·
(
1± 1200N
)b
Pi(y, yi, x;F) ∈ Pi−1(y, yi, x;F) · q ·
(
0.9 · 49
)b
·
(
1± 1200N
)b
Φy,yi /∈ TQBF =⇒ Pi(y, yi, x; θ0) ∈ Pi−1(y, yi, x; θ0) · q · 0.9b ·
(
1± 1200N
)b
, (18)
where q is a universal factor coming from private signals in auxiliary agents in the not-equal
gadgets.
Recall that the first invariant tells us that for some β′ = β(i− 1) ∈ (0, 1), if Φy,yi is true, then
T is β′-likely and F is 23β′-likely, and if Φy,yi is false, then T is
4
9β
′-likely and F is 23β′-likely, all
with error i−1100N .
Note that Φy is true if and only if Φy,yi is true for all yi. Equivalently, Φy is false if and only if
there exists yi such that Φy,yi is false. Take β := β(i) := β′ · q1/b · 0.9 · 23 . Then, the first invariant
implies that if Φy is true, then T is 23β-likely and F is
4
9β-likely, with error
i
100N . To see that, note
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that, by (18) and induction, we have that for every y, yi, x:
Pi(y, yi, x,T) ≤ Pi−1(y, yi, x,T) · q ·
(
0.9 · 49
)b(
1 + 1200N
)b
≤ (β′)b
(
1 + i− 1100N
)b
· q ·
(
0.9 · 49
)b(
1 + 1200N
)b
≤
(
2
3 · β
)b
(1 + ε)b ,
Pi(y, yi, x,F) ≤
(
2
3 · β
′
)b(
1 + i− 1100N
)b
· q ·
(
0.9 · 49
)b(
1 + 1200N
)b
≤
(
4
9 · β
)b
(1 + ε)b .
At the same time, symmetric computations give also that for every y there exist yi and x (just
take arbitrary yi and x that exists for Φy,yi by the first invariant) such that
Pi(y, yi, x,T) ≥
(
2
3 · β
)b
(1− ε)b ,
Pi(y, yi, x,F) ≥
(
4
9 · β
)b
(1− ε)b .
On the other hand, if Φy is false, then we need to consider both (17) and (18) to conclude
that T is 23β-likely and F is β-likely with error ε. However, the computation is very similar to the
previous ones and we skip it. Therefore, we implemented the quantifier switch and reestablished
the first induction invariant.
Finally, we need to use a computation similar as in (12) and (13) to check the second invariant.
If Φy is true, then, since T is 23β-likely and F is
4
9β-likely with error
i
100N ,
1− µ(OBSi) ≤ 2
Nβb(4/9)b(1 + i/100N)b
βb(2/3)b(1− i/100N)b ≤
2N (2/3)b1.01b
0.99b ≤ (2/3)
b · 1.03b · 2N ≤ 0.69b ,
1− µ(OBSi) ≥ β
b(4/9)b(1− i/100N)b
2Nβb(2/3)b(1 + i/100N)b ≥
2N (2/3)b0.99b
1.01b ≥ (2/3)
b · 0.97b · 2N ≥ 0.64b .
A symmetric computation confirms that the second invariant is preserved also when Φy is false.
5 Bounded signals: Proof of Theorem 7
One could object that our reduction uses private signal distributions with probabilities that are
exponentially close to zero and one. Given that it is a worst-case reduction, with relevant configu-
rations arising with exponentially small probability, we do not think this is a significant issue. In
any case, in this section we explain how to modify the proof of Theorem 3 so that it uses only a
fixed collection of (say, at most fifty) private signal distributions.
Note that the only agents we need to replace are A,B from the 3-SAT reduction, and Ai, Bi
from the induction step in the PSPACE reduction, as well as their associated not-equal gadgets.
We sketch the modifications on one example, since other cases are analogous. To this end, take
even i and consider Ai, Bi and their not-equal gadgets (cf. Figures 9 and 10).
Going back to the proof of Theorem 3, in particular equations (17)-(18), what we would like to
have is that for every consistent configuration on Gi−1, there should be a unique way of extending
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it to a consistent configuration on Gi such that for an assignment (y, x) and θ0 ∈ {F,T},
Pi(y, x, θ0) = Pi−1(y, x, θ0) · r ·

αb1 if A(OBSi−1) = T and θ0 = T,
αb4 if A(OBSi−1) = T and θ0 = F,
αb3 if A(OBSi−1) = F and θ0 = T,
αb2 if A(OBSi−1) = F and θ0 = F,
for some r ∈ (0, 1) independent of (y, x, θ0). We are going to achieve this using two independent
gadgets corresponding to Ai and Bi. Again, we only sketch the construction for Ai. What we
need, then, is to create a gadget that extends every consistent configuration on Gi−1 to a unique
consistent configuration on Gi such that
Pi(y, x, θ0) = Pi−1(y, x, θ0) · r ·

αb1 if A(OBSi−1) = T = θ0,
αb2 if A(OBSi−1) = F = θ0,
1 otherwise.
(19)
This is achieved as shown in Figure 11. We create an agent F with fixed, arbitrary distribution,
say pF(F ) = 1/4 and pT(F ) = 3/4. Then, we add agents Cj , Dj , Ej for j = 1, . . . , b with private
signal distributions
pθ0(Dj) := pθ0 ,
pθ0(Cj) := pθ0(Ej) := qθ0 ,
for some (αi-dependent) constants pF, pT, qF, qT that we will specify shortly.
For each triple Cj , Dj , Ej we also place three not-equal gadgets observed by OBSi: Respectively,
between F and Cj , Cj and Dj , and Dj and Ej . We also create an agent F ′ with the same signal
distribution as F , and a counting gadget with equivalence observed by OBSi, making sure that
S(F ) + S(F ′) = 1 (this is to get rid of a small distortion in (19) due to signal of agent F ; we will
not worry about it from now on). Finally, we place a gadget between OBSi−1 and F generalizing
the modified not-equal gadget from Theorem 3. This gadget will be observed by OBSi and we will
fill in its details later.
Figure 11: Bounded signals gadget. One out of b parts is shown. The details of the modified
not-equal gadget between OBSi−1 and F are not shown, and the counting gadget between F and
F ′ is not included.
OBSi−1 F
3/4, 1/4
Cj
qT, qF
Dj
pT, pF
Ej
qT, qF
...
...
...
OBSi
6= 6= 6=! 6=
Let us assume for now that the modified not-equal gadget ensures that A(OBSi−1) 6= A(F ) in
every consistent configuration. Then, since not-equal gadgets guarantee S(F ) = S(Dj) 6= S(Cj) =
S(Ej) for every j, we claim that it is not difficult to see that every consistent configuration on
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Gi−1 can be uniquely extended to consistent configuration on Gi such that
Pi(y, x, θ0) = Pi−1(y, x, θ0) · r ·

(
q2T(1− pT)
)b if A(OBSi−1) = T and θ0 = T,(
q2F(1− pF)
)b if A(OBSi−1) = T and θ0 = F,(
(1− qT)2pT
)b if A(OBSi−1) = F and θ0 = T,(
(1− qF)2pF
)b if A(OBSi−1) = F and θ0 = F.
Comparing with (19), we need to find pF, pT, qF, qT satisfying
q2T(1− pT)
α1
= q2F(1− pF) = (1− qT)2pT =
(1− qF)2pF
α2
. (20)
Separately comparing and transforming the terms in (20): second with fourth, and then first with
third, we get
pF =
α2q
2
F
α2q2F + (1− qF)2
, pT =
q2T
q2T + α1(1− qT)2
,
which can be substituted into comparison of the first and second term, yielding
q2T(1− qT)2
q2T + α1(1− qT)2
= q
2
F(1− qF)2
α2q2F + (1− qF)2
.
Taking qT := 1−ε for small enough ε > 0, this can be checked to have a solution with qF = ε+O(ε2),
pF = α2ε2 +O(ε3) and pT = 1− α1ε2 +O(ε3).
We still need to explain how to construct the modified not-equal gadget ensuring thatA(OBSi−1) 6=
A(F ). This is a generalization of the construction in Figure 9 and is shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Implementation of the modified not-equal gadget (marked in blue in Figure 11).
OBSi−1 F Cj Dj Ej
...
...
...
T
· · ·
T ′1
−0.2
T ′′1
0.2
· · ·
T ′b
−0.2
T ′′b
0.2
OBSi
Yet again, it is achieved by combining two threshold gadgets and we focus on one of them.
Recall from Table 1 that this threshold was set at δ = 0.2b. The objective is to ensure that
A(T ) = A(F ) = T if and only if an inequality like (16) holds.
The threshold gadget will have a “counting agent” T and auxiliary agents T ′1, . . . , T ′b and
T ′′1 , . . . , T
′′
b . Auxiliary agents receive private signals with likelihoods `0(T ′j) := −0.2 and `1(T ′′j ) :=
0.2. Agent T observes OBSi−1, as well as other gadgets and agents in the network Gi−1, in the
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same way as agent T1 in Figure 9. Additionally, it directly observes all agents with private signals
in the counting gadget between F and F ′, as well as all of Cj , Dj and Ej . Finally, it observes
T ′1, . . . , T
′
b. Agent OBSi observes T ′1, . . . , T ′b, T ′′1 , . . . , T ′′b and T . As expected, we specify that at the
significant time OBSi observes actions A(T ′j) = F, A(T ′′j ) = T and A(T ) = F. Note that we do not
need to change the significant time of OBSi.
Assuming that A(OBSi−1) = θ1 and A(F ) = θ2, we use the same reasoning as in (16) to
compute the likelihood m(θ1) that agent T can infer from looking at Gi−1, another likelihood `(θ2)
that can be inferred from looking at F,Cj , Dj , Ej and the likelihood −δ = −0.2b arising from
looking at T ′1, . . . , T ′b. The bounds on m(θ1) are the same as in (15), and as for `(θ2), from (20)
we get, as expected `(F) = −b ln 1α1 and `(T) = b ln 1α2 .
Since the private signals in these three parts of the graph are conditionally independent, these
likelihoods can be added up to ensure that A(T ) = F if and only if
m(θ1) + `(θ2) < δ ,
which implies, the same as in the proof of Theorem 3, that in a consistent configuration either
θ1 = F or θ2 = F.
As mentioned, other cases proceed in a similar manner. One difference is that for agents A and
B in the base case (3-SAT reduction), EVAL is a simple agent with bounded signal (as opposed
to OBSi−1). However, this is only good news for us: We do not need to implement the modified
not-equal gadget, since a simple not-equal gadget between B and EVAL suffices.
6 #P-hardness of revealed beliefs: Proof of Theorem 9
Reduction Our reduction uses the DAG structure and the concept of significant time as ex-
plained in Section 3. The general idea is as in Theorem 1, with some adaptations to the counting
setting and revealed beliefs. We assume that the agents broadcast beliefs in the form of likelihoods.
We define a common signal distribution with pT := 3/4 and pF := 1/4 and respective likelihoods
`1 and `0. The graph we construct contains an observer agent OBS with no private signal and
the “evaluation” agent EVAL with (pT, pF) private signal. Given a 2-SAT formula φ with variables
x1, . . . , xN and clauses C1, . . . , CM , respective variable and clause gadgets are designed as follows:
For a variable xi, we create two agents xi and ¬xi, receiving (pT, pF) private signals. Those
two agents are observed by an auxiliary agent, which in turn is observed by agent OBS. The
observation history of OBS indicates that the auxiliary agent broadcast likelihood A = `0 + `1. At
the same time, OBS observes another auxiliary agent with informative private signal, broadcasting
likelihood A = −`0− `1. See Figure 13 for illustration. Since the likelihood broadcast by the agent
observing xi and ¬xi is the sum of their likelihoods, we can perform an analysis similar to the
threshold gadget in the binary action model. The result is that the variable gadget ensures that
S(xi) 6= S(¬xi) and that each consistent signal configuration gives equal likelihoods of θ = T and
θ = F.
In the clause gadget (see Figure 14) for a clause Cj there is an auxiliary agent observing four
agents:
• Two agents corresponding to literals occurring in Cj .
• Agent EVAL.
• Agent Ej that receives a private signal S(Ej) ∈ {0, 1, 2}. For simplicity we relax our model
a bit and allow a private signal with ternary value. Its signal distribution is such that the
respective likelihoods satisfy
m0 := `0(Ej) = ln
Pr[S(Ej) = 0 | Θ = T]
Pr[S(Ej) = 0 | Θ = F] ,
m1 := `1(Ej) = m0 +D ,
m2 := `2(Ej) = m0 + 2D , (21)
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Figure 13: Revealed belief reduction: Variable gadget.
`0, `1
xi
`0, `1
¬xi
−`0 − `1
`0 + `1
OBS
where D := `1 − `0 = 2 ln 3. Furthermore, the probabilities q(θ0, b) := Pr[S(Ej) = b | θ = θ0]
for θ0 ∈ {T,F} and b ∈ {0, 1, 2} are chosen such that
q(T, 2)q(T, 0) = q(T, 1)2 = q(F, 2)q(F, 0) = q(F, 1)2 . (22)
One checks that (21) and (22) are achieved (with m0 = −D) by setting q(T, 2) = q(F, 0) =
q′′, q(T, 1) = q(F, 1) = q′, q(T, 0) = q(F, 2) = 1− q′ − q′′, where (q′′, q′) is the unique positive
solution of {
q′′
1−q′−q′′ = 9 ,
(q′)2 = q′(1− q′ − q′′) ,
which turns out to be q′′ = 9/13 and q′ = 3/13.
The auxiliary agent is observed by OBS, broadcasting belief A = 3`0 +m0 + 3D.
Figure 14: Clause gadget.
Cj = ¬x1 ∨ x3
`0, `0 +D
¬x1
`0, `0 +D
x3
m0,m0 +D
m0 + 2D
Ej
`0, `0 +D
EVAL
3`0 +m0 + 3D
OBS
Since we want to be somewhat more precise in counting likelihoods induced by different assign-
ments, we introduce additional gadgets “neutralizing” likelihoods induced by signals of agents Ej
and EVAL, illustrated in Figure 15. Their principle is basically the same as for the variable agents.
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For example, for each agent Ej we introduce another agent Fj with the same signal distribution,
an agent observing both Ej and Fj and broadcasting A = 2m0 +2D to OBS and yet another agent
broadcasting opposite belief A = −2m0 − 2D to OBS. In all, these agents ensure that any private
signals to Ej and EVAL do not affect the likelihood of state of the world θ.
Figure 15: Gadgets for Ej and EVAL agents.
−2m0 − 2D
m0,m0 +D
m0 + 2D
Ej
m0,m0 +D
m0 + 2D
Fj
2m0 + 2D
· · ·
`0, `1
EVAL
`0, `1
−`0 − `1
`0 + `1
OBS
Finally, we let b := 2N and introduce agents A1, . . . , Ab and B1, . . . , Bb. Each agent Ai receives
a (pT, pF) private signal. Agent Bi observes agents EVAL and Ai and broadcasts `0 + `1 to agent
OBS (see Figure 16). This concludes the description of the reduction.
Figure 16: One of K parts of the “amplification” mechanism.
`0, `1
EVAL
`0, `1
Ai
Bi
`0 + `1
OBS
Analysis The analysis proceeds analogous to the proof of Theorem 1. First, the network is
clearly of size O(N +M) and has the required DAG structure with significant time t = 2 for agent
OBS. Next, we convince ourselves that the private signals consistent with observations of OBS can
be characterized as:
• For each assignment x there exists exactly one consistent configuration of private signals such
that S(EVAL) = 1 and S(Ai) = 0 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , b}.
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• For each satisfying assignment x there is exactly one consistent configuration such that
S(EVAL) = 0 and S(Ai) = 1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , b}.
• There are no other consistent signal configurations.
Then, we define P (x, s, θ0) as the probability that θ = θ0 and that there arises the unique signal
configuration consistent with assignment x and S(EVAL) = s. The gadgets (recall the relation (22)
for agents Ej and Fj) ensure that P (·) is equal to
P (x, 1,T) = q ·
(
1
4
)b
, P (x, 1,F) = q ·
(
3
4
)b
,
and, for each assignment x that is satisfying, additionally
P (x, 0,T) = q ·
(
3
4
)b
, P (x, 0,F) = q ·
(
1
4
)b
,
where q is a universal common factor that depends only on N and M . Recalling that A denotes
the number of satisfying assignments in φ, we can conclude that the likelihood of agent OBS at its
significant time t = 2 is given by
µ(OBS)
1− µ(OBS) =
A · (3/4)b + 2N · (1/4)b
2N · (3/4)b +A · (1/4)b =
A
2N ·
1 + 2N
A·3b
1 + A2N ·3b
∈ A2N ·
[
1− 13b , 1 +
2N
3b
]
⊆ A2N ·
[
1± 14N
]
.
In particular, ∣∣∣∣ µ(OBS)1− µ(OBS) − A2N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ A8N < 12N+1 ,
so rounding the likelihood to the nearest multiple of 2−N successfully recovers the number of
satisfying assignments A.
7 Conclusion
A natural open question is to make progress on the approximate-case hardness in one of the models.
For example, one could try to establish NP-hardness for a worst-case network, but holding for signal
configurations arising with non-negligible probability. In a different direction, as was mentioned in
the introduction, there remains a gap between our PSPACE-hardness result and exponential space
required by the best known algorithm.
Another interesting problem arises from trying to extend our results to the revealed beliefs
model, as discussed in Sections 2.3 and 6. Thinking in terms of two-player games, consider a class
of “no-mistakes-allowed” games: Games where the player with winning strategy always has exactly
one winning move, with all alternative moves in a given position leading to a losing position (and
this property holding recursively in all positions reachable from the initial one).
Certainly deciding if a position is winning for the first player in such games is in PSPACE. On
the other hand, since such a game with just the existential player corresponds to a SAT formula
with zero or one satisfying assignments, by the Valiant-Vazirani theorem [VV86] it is also (morally)
NP-hard. This leaves a large gap between NP and PSPACE.
For example, suppose we want to prove Π2-hardness in the revealed belief model. Then it is
natural to consider formulas of the form
∀x∃y : φ(x, y) ,
and the question becomes: How hard is it to distinguish between the cases
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• YES: For all x, there exists unique y such that φ(x, y) = 1.
• NO: There exists unique x0 such that no y satisfies φ(x0, ·). For all other x, there exists a
unique y such that φ(x, y) = 1.
How hard is this problem? In particular, can it be shown to be harder than NP (in some sense)?
Hardness of such games can be thought of as a generalization of the Valiant-Vazirani theorem.
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